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Jessica Bradley was a ninth grade student at Covenant Christian
Academy (“CCA”) in Longville, Georgia.1 Jessica was a good student,
earning “A”s and “B”s in most of her classes.2 She performed especially
well in her Bible studies class.3 In April 2005, Jessica attended a sleepover
∗ The authors would personally like to thank Casey Sprock, and Andrew
Seligsohn for taking the time to read this paper and lend us their feedback and
expertise. Jennifer Lunsford is an attorney at Segar & Sciortino in Rochester, New
York. Dual B.A. in Philosophy and Political Science, Hartwick College; J.D. Boston
University. R. Zachary Sanzone is an English teacher pursuing a Certificate of
Advanced Graduate Studies in the School of Education at Boston University. Double
B.A. in history and English, Hartwick College; M.S. English Education, Syracuse
University.
1. S. EDUC. FOUND., GEORGIA’S TAX DOLLARS HELP FINANCE PRIVATE SCHOOLS
WITH SEVERE ANTI-GAY POLICIES, PRACTICES, & TEACHINGS 13 (2013), available at
http://www.southerneducation.org/getattachment/857328be-3d6b-415f-af8bda7bd3b75519/Georgia.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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party at a friend’s house.4 At the party, Jessica allegedly kissed another
girl.5 On April 26, 2005, a few days after the party, rumors spread about
the kiss.6 School officials pulled Jessica out of class to question her about
her “inappropriate relationship” with this other girl.7 Jessica denied the
allegations. Despite her denial, the headmaster of CCA asked Jessica to
withdraw from school for “engaging in sexual immorality.”8
Jessica’s father filed suit on her behalf against CCA.9 CCA defended its
actions on the grounds that Jessica was in violation of their school policy
prohibiting students from engaging in sexual immorality on or off
campus.10 CCA argued that the First Amendment insulated them against
legal actions relating to “a religious organization’s doctrinal determinations
governing the discipline of its students for sexual immorality in violation of
the Biblical/Christian lifestyle expectations for students attending the faithbased CCA.”11 Jessica and her family lost their lawsuit and eventually
moved out of Georgia entirely.12
In late 2008, CCA became affiliated with the newly created Georgia
Student Scholarship Organization (“GaSSO”), one of several Student
Scholarship Organizations (“SSO”) in Georgia through which it received
diverted taxpayer funds from the tax-credit scholarship program.13 At the
same time, CCA also revised its policies on sexual immorality to include
biblical passages which it believed expressly condemn homosexuality.14
The Jessica Bradley case is just one example of a pervasive problem in
certain kinds of private, religious schools throughout the United States.
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, and Questioning (“LGBTQ”)15
students are being oppressed, stigmatized, and discriminated against, from
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 14 (“We believe that any form of homosexuality, lesbianism, bisexuality,
bestiality, incest, fornication, adultery, and pornography are sinful perversions of God’s
gift of sex.”).
15. There are many different kinds of acronyms that describe the gay and lesbian
community. For the purposes of consistency, I will be referring to the community as
Lesbian, Gay, Bi, Transsexual, and Questioning (LGBTQ). Any other identity related
to this community that is not mentioned is not meant as disrespect.
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both their peers and school and community leaders.
In some cases, these schools condemn not only what they perceive to be
immoral conduct, but also advocacy and even “tolerance” for LGBTQ
rights.16 Addressing this issue is no small task, particularly when the worst
offenders are private, religious schools that enjoy broad First Amendment
protections. The following pages discuss the First Amendment protections
and recommend a plan for circumventing them.
Congress has broad taxation powers.17 As such, both the government
and the citizenry have used the tax code throughout history to accomplish
otherwise impossible goals. In the 1960s and 1970s, following the forced
desegregation of public schools, private, religious schools began cropping
up all over the country to provide a de facto segregated experience to white
students. The legal obstacles that prevented the government from forcing
these schools to accept black students are the same obstacles standing in
the way of LGBTQ integration in similar schools today. To circumvent
these legal obstacles the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Revenue
Rule 71-447, which refused 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status to
private schools with racially discriminatory admission standards. Section
501(c)(3) status was vital to these schools as it allowed them to not only
avoid tax burdens, but also encouraged monetary contributions from others
by making donations tax deductible under 26 U.S.C. § 170.18 This revenue
rule effectively put a chokehold on the funding stream for private, religious
schools that refused to accept non-white students, thereby forcing these
schools to either integrate or close their doors. Implementing such a
method today can help integrate LGBTQ students into the classroom
community.
In Part I, this paper will summarize the existing Supreme Court
jurisprudence relating to LGBTQ rights. Part II will focus on the
development of the constitutional protections afforded to private, religious
schools throughout history and today, in light of the recent decision in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. Part III will discuss the legal fight against school
segregation that ultimately led to the passage of IRS Revenue Rule 71-447.
Part IV will present a case study of LGBTQ rights, or lack thereof, in
certain private, religious schools in the State of Georgia, which receives
public funding from deferred tax dollars. Part V outlines the impact of
discriminatory policies on the LGBTQ youth community. Finally, the
conclusion will cover some recent developments in LGBTQ rights that
16. Alex Morris, The Hidden War Against Gay Teens, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 10,
2013),
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/the-hidden-war-against-gay-teens20131010.
17. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
18. See Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015

3

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 3

438

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 23:3

unfolded while working on this paper.
I. LGBTQ RIGHTS IN SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court first addressed the question of LGBTQ rights headon in 1986 in Bowers v. Hardwick.19 Bowers was a challenge to a Georgia
law that prohibited acts of sodomy. While the law’s language used genderneutral terms criminalizing sodomy between any two people, the local
authorities enforced the law only against homosexuals.20 Justice Byron
White, writing for the majority and applying a rational basis standard of
review, held in a 5-4 ruling that the Georgia law was constitutional on the
grounds that the Constitution does not confer a “fundamental right to
homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy.”21 In a scathing
dissent, Justice Blackmun wrote:
This case is no more about ‘a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy,’ . . . than Stanley v. Georgia was about the fundamental right to
watch obscene movies . . . . Rather, this case is about ‘the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,’
22
namely, ‘the right to be let alone.’

Blackmun’s argument was one of a new generation. While “tradition”
and “cultural norms” may have won the day in 1986, sentiments were
shifting in America. In fact, Justice Lewis Powell, who was the swing vote
in this 1986 decision, later stated, referring to his decision in Bowers, that
he “probably made a mistake in that one.”23 While the case was pending,
Justice Powell confided in one of his law clerks, “I do not believe I’ve ever
met a homosexual.”24 The law clerk, who Justice Powell did not know was
gay, told the Justice “[c]ertainly you have, but you just don’t know that
they are.”25
In 2003, the Supreme Court overturned Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas.26
Ruling 6-3, with Justice Anthony Kennedy writing the majority opinion,
19. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
20. See id. at 190.
21. Id. at 193.
22. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
558 (1969)).
23. Linda Greenhouse, The Legacy of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4,
2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/04/politics/04SCOT.html.
24. See id.
25. Id.
26. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188).
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the Supreme Court overturned a Texas sodomy law that made it a crime for
two persons of the same sex to engage in certain sexual acts.27 This classbased discrimination gave the court the footing it needed to overturn
Bowers and begin moving the country forward on the issue of same-sex
sexual congress.28 Unlike in Bowers, the question presented to the court in
Lawrence was one of a fundamental right to privacy, not to “homosexual
sodomy.”29 Justice Kennedy, in framing the discussion, stated, “when
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person,
the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
persons the right to make this choice.”30
In an effort to ensure that laws like this Texas statute would never be
redrawn to comply with some theoretical constitutional mandate, Justice
Kennedy went on to hold that such statutes are a violation of the Due
Process Clause of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. He stated
“there has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in
circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent” than
the right to personal privacy.31
Romer v. Evans is another landmark case in the jurisprudential history of
LGBTQ rights. This case, decided between Bowers and Lawrence, dealt
with a Colorado constitutional amendment that prohibited, not sexual acts
between same-sex persons, but any state action, whether it be judicial,
executive, or legislative, aimed at protecting homosexuals from
discrimination.32 The Supreme Court, voting 6-3 with Justice Kennedy
writing for the majority, held that such a law made a class-based
discrimination, which violated the Equal Protection Clause and failed to
advance a legitimate government interest.33 The standard applied was
again one of rational basis review. Justice Kennedy wrote “[i]n the
ordinary case, a law will be sustained if it can be said to advance a
legitimate government interest, even if the law seems unwise or works to
the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems
tenuous.”34 The Colorado amendment failed to satisfy the rational basis
standard. While the Court made increasing headway toward establishing

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 561, 579.
Id. at 568-69.
Id. at 566, 571.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 577.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
Id. at 625-26.
Id. at 632.
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constitutional protections for discrimination against LGBTQ persons, it
declined to place them in a protected class that would afford them a higher
level of protection. As such, courts applied the rational basis standard to
any discriminatory law against LGBTQ persons, which was insufficient to
protect against discrimination from those with a strong constitutional claim
of their own—like the Boy Scouts of America.
The Boy Scouts of America, much like the private, religious schools
discussed herein, is a private, nonprofit organization.35 It has long required
that its members take an oath to, among other things, remain “morally
straight” and “clean.”36 The Boy Scouts leadership interprets its oath to
prohibit homosexual behavior, which it deems outside its value system. In
1990, James Dale, an Eagle Scout and Troop Leader, had his adult
membership revoked on the grounds that he was a homosexual.37 Dale
brought suit alleging that the revocation of his membership was unlawful
under the New Jersey, which prohibited discrimination sexual orientation.38
The Supreme Court, voting 5-4 with Justice Rehnquist writing for the
majority, held that the Boy Scouts, as a private organization, were free to
associate, or not associate, with whomever they chose.39 Justice Rehnquist
held that forcing a group to include an unwanted person violated that
group’s right to free association and free expression.40 However, the Court
recognized that this right was not absolute.41 These freedoms of
association and expression “could be overridden ‘by regulations adopted to
serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas,
which cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms.’”42 Here the Court invokes strict scrutiny, as it is a
First Amendment right it considers here, instead of the more amorphous
right to “privacy” or “freedom from discrimination.”
The Boy Scouts of America are similar to private, religious schools in so
much as they are non-public organizations that operate by strict moral
guidelines based on religious principles, though they are not, strictly
speaking, religious organizations in the same way a church or synagogue is.
This next section applies the holdings in Boy Scouts and its progeny to the
issue presented by overt discrimination against LGBTQ students in private,

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 643 (2000).
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 648.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)).
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religious schools.
II. PRIVATE, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION AGAINST PROVIDING CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
A. First Amendment Limitations
The First Amendment provides protection to the citizenry against
government infringement of certain inalienable rights, including freedoms
of speech, association, and religious expression.43 Public schools, which
are funded by taxpayer money and organized by local, state, and federal
law, are held to the same standards as any other governmental entity and
prohibited from infringing on the constitutional rights of their students and
employees.44 While the Supreme Court has held consistently for over fifty
years that public schools must operate within the boundaries of the
Constitution, these same rules do not apply to private schools, which are
not governmental entities, and therefore are not traditionally bound by the
Constitution.45
In attempting to apply constitutional boundaries to a private school, one
might first argue that a private school serves a public function and therefore
should be bound by public laws and restrictions. This very issue was
litigated all the way to the Supreme Court.46 In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, an
employee discharged after openly disagreeing with an administrative policy
sued a private, secular school that received over ninety percent of its
funding from public monies.47 The question before the Court was whether
a private school, which was primarily funded by public funds and governed
by public authorities, “acted under color of state law” when it discharged
certain employees for expressing an opinion contrary to the school’s
administrative policy.48 The Court asked four questions to determine if the
school’s action could be construed as state action for constitutional
purposes: (1) did the institution depend on state funds; (2) what was the
degree of regulation by the state; (3) did the institution perform a public
function; and (4) was there a symbiotic relationship between the school and
43. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
44. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1969)

(“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gates.”).
45. Id.
46. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
47. Id. at 832.
48. Id. at 831.
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the state.49
With regard to the first inquiry, the fact that the school received almost
all of its funding from the State did not render it a state actor.50 Second,
while the State heavily regulated the school, the State had no influence over
the dismissal of these particular employees so the relevant regulations were
not in any way responsible for the particular school action at issue.51 Third,
“the relevant question is not simply whether a private group is serving a
‘public function’. . .” but rather “whether the function performed has been
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.”52 In response to that
inquiry, the Court held that education, in this case of maladjusted
teenagers, is not an exclusive state function. “That a private entity
performs a function which serves the public does not make its acts state
action.”53 Last, as to whether there is a symbiotic relationship between the
school and the state, the Court held that unlike a private for-profit
business,54 a school’s “fiscal relationship with the State is not different
from that of many contractors performing services for the government,”
and is therefore not state action.55
This argument is further complicated when the private institution is also
religious. In this scenario, not only is there a heavy burden of proving that
a particular action rises to the level of state action, but if it does, then one
must also prove that requiring compliance with the Constitution will not
infringe the religious school’s own First Amendment rights. Religious
schools are religious organizations subject to the protection of the First
Amendment.56 Like the Boy Scouts, a private religious school is an
“expressive association” and the Constitution protects its right to associate,
or not associate, with whomever it chooses as fiercely as any other
constitutional right bestowed upon individual citizens.57 This principle
“applies with special force with respect to religious groups, whose very
existence is dedicated to the collective expression and propagation of
shared religious ideals.”58
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 840-42.
Id. at 840.
Id. at 841.
Id. at 842.
Id.
Such as a restaurant, See generally Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
55. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 843.
56. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S.
Ct. 694, 712 (2012).
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882
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The next question to consider is whether diverting any public funds to
religious schools violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court addressed this question in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris.59 In Zelman, a group of Ohio taxpayers sued the State
claiming that a program similar to the Georgia program discussed in this
paper violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.60
Because the vast majority of schools that received the diverted public funds
were religious, these taxpayers argued that the program had the “primary
affect” of advancing religion.61 The Court disagreed with the taxpayer’s
position, finding that this program provided “true private choice” to parents
who sought educational opportunities for their children outside of the
existing public school structure in Ohio, which was failing in many cases.62
The Court found that the program, as applied, was “entirely neutral with
respect to religion.”63 The program provided benefit to “a wide spectrum
of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a particular
school district . . .” and permitted those individuals “to exercise genuine
choice among options public and private, secular, and religious.64 The fact
that almost all private choices were religious did not change the fact that
the program was written in religiously neutral terms.
The First Amendment protections enjoyed by religious schools is only
one hurdle that would need to be overcome to legislate away the type of
discrimination this paper addresses. Moreover, federal laws also exist to
protect religious expression for private organizations, even those that
organize as for-profit corporations.
B. Hobby Lobby and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
Governmental interference with the business of any organization that
holds itself out as “religious” is fraught with complications. This is
especially true following with Supreme Court’s most recent decision in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.65 Hobby Lobby dealt with the question of
whether closely held, for-profit corporations could be compelled to provide
coverage for birth control methods they felt contradicted their bona fide
religious beliefs. The Court based its decision on the Religious Freedom

(1990)).
59. 536 U.S 639 (2002).
60. Id. at 648.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 653.
63. Id. at 662.
64. Id.
65. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), which states that the Government may
not “substantially burden” a person’s religious exercise “even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability.”66 As such, even if a law does
not expressly address the exercise of religion, but has the effect of
burdening one’s religious expression, it violates the RFRA.
The RFRA codifies the legal standard for any case involving a law that
has the effect of burdening religious expression, namely, strict scrutiny.
Therefore, to withstand a constitutional challenge, any such law would
need to provide the least restrictive means possible for furthering a
compelling government interest. Hobby Lobby extended the reach of RFRA
to closely held, for-profit corporations with bona fide religious objections,
a departure from the previous case law.67
While the Court was careful to state that Hobby Lobby is concerned
“solely with the contraceptive mandate,” and that other issues, even those
dealing with the insurance coverage mandate in the Affordable Care Act,
“may be supported by different interests,” the implications this ruling could
have on other kinds of religious objections is evident.68 Justice Ginsberg,
in a lengthy and powerful dissent, notes that the same reasoning applied by
the Court with regard to religious objections to contraception could easily
be used to exclude a company from laws prohibiting discrimination based
on race, if the company managed to raise bona fide religious objections for
that position.69 Justice Alito, writing for the majority, responds that the
Hobby Lobby decision “provides no such shield” because the Government
has a “compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate
in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial
discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal.”70
However, this argument ignores other forms of discrimination, such as the
discrimination against LGBTQ students. What will happen if Congress
were to draft a law prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals in
hiring and admissions at private, religious schools? Could such a law
withstand a challenge under RFRA in light of the Hobby Lobby ruling?
Despite Justice Alito’s protestations to the contrary, it seems possible, if
not probable, that such a law would fail the least restrictive means test, as
public schools are available to provide the necessary accommodations for
LGBTQ students. The test of this ruling will likely come quickly as
religious organizations gear up for a fight against President Obama’s
Executive Order that prohibits discrimination by the United States
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.
Id. at 2783.
Id. at 2804-05 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
Id.
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Government and federal contractors against individuals based on sexual
orientation and gender identity.71
While the First Amendment and RFRA certainly present robust
challenges to any federal law seeking to legislate away discrimination,
there is one avenue left open by Hobby Lobby that may provide the
necessary ammunition needed to fight LGBTQ discrimination in private
religious schools: tax laws. Justice Alito expressly stated that an employer
would not be able to use RFRA to avoid tax liability due to religious
objections. “Because of the enormous variety of government expenditures
funded by tax dollars, allowing taxpayers to withhold a portion of their tax
obligations on religious grounds would lead to chaos.”72 He analyzed
United States v. Lee, which was a free-exercise case involving the objection
of an Amish man from payment of Social Security taxes.73 There, the
Court held that while the imposition of this tax was in fact a burden on the
plaintiff’s religion, it was not unconstitutional because the burden furthered
a compelling government interest.74 While Lee does not involve RFRA,
Justice Alito goes on to state that even if it did, Lee’s case would fail under
that analysis as well.
Therefore, when faced with the almost insurmountable obstacles to
direct legislation against discrimination of LGBTQ students in private,
religious schools, social regulation requires a more indirect, but
exceedingly effective approach: regulation through the tax code. The next
section will discuss the history of Revenue Rule 7-447 and how it was used
to help end racial discrimination in private, religious schools.
C. THE LEGAL HISTORY OF REVENUE RULE 71-447
In 1964, following the passage of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal
government ordered the desegregation of all of the nation’s public
schools.75 Over the next five years, an enormous upsurge occurred in the
establishment of private, religious schools with racially discriminatory
admission policies throughout the south.76 In Mississippi, the state went
one step further, actually encouraging these private, segregated schools to
open—by passing Senate Bill 1501—a grant program that helped pay
tuition to students wishing to attend private schools.77 The preamble of this
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42971 (Jul. 21, 2014).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2784.
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
Id.
Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm’n, 296 F. Supp. 1389, 1391 (S.D. Miss 1969).
Id.
Id.
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bill, which promulgated the regulations governing these tuition grants,
stated that the bill’s purpose was “to encourage the education of all of the
children of Mississippi” and “to afford each individual freedom in choosing
public or private schooling.”78 At the time the bill was passed, only three
non-sectarian private schools existed that offered courses to students who
received these state grants.79 By the 1965-1966 school year, twenty new
private schools had formed.80 Each of the new schools opened that year
accepted state grant money and were either in districts desegregated by
court order or voluntarily submitted desegregation plans to the federal
government.81 By 1969, the number of private schools in Mississippi had
risen to forty-nine.82 Of those forty-nine schools in which students
received state grants, forty-eight had no African-American students.83 The
forty-ninth school was one-hundred percent African-American.84
Eventually, a group of African-American students and their parents
brought a class action suit in federal court to seek injunctive relief against
these patently discriminatory school admission practices.85 The Southern
District of Mississippi held that:
The evidence compels our conclusion that the tuition grants have
fostered the creation of private segregated schools. The statute, as
amended, encourages, facilitates, and supports the establishment of a
system of private schools operated on a racially segregated basis as an
alternative available to white students seeking to avoid desegregated
public schools. We find the language in Griffin v. State Board of
Education . . . that the grants ‘tend in a determinative degree to
perpetuate segregation’ thereby violating the equal protection clause of
86
the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Despite the claims made by these schools, the court found that the
schools’ actions resulted in segregation and held those actions to be
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.87
In 1970, a similar group of African-American Mississippians and their
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1392.
Id. at 1390.
Id. at 1392.
Id.
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children brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, arguing that these same private schools in Mississippi with
discriminatory admission practices ought not to qualify for tax-exempt
status under sections 170 and 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.88
Further, the plaintiffs argued that these tax exemption codes were
unconstitutional because the codes supported “the establishment and
maintenance of segregated private schools through tax benefits, and
particularly through income tax deductions made available to persons
making contributions to such schools,” and that such deductions and
exemptions violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.89
The IRS was well aware of the issue of tax exemptions being used to
prop up racially segregated schools. Beginning October 15, 1965,
applications for § 501(c)(3) exemption status by private schools believed to
operate on a segregated basis were “sent to the National Office for
processing” and effectively froze pending review of the legal issues
involved.90 On August 2, 1967, the IRS announced its policy against
granting exemption status to private schools that operated on a (1)
“segregated basis” and (2) for some unconstitutional purpose.91
On the date this policy was announced, forty-two segregated private
schools were issued 501(c)(3) status, and many more were approved
thereafter.92 The IRS’s position was that segregated private schools would
only be denied tax-exempt status “if the operation of the school [was]
otherwise unconstitutional by virtue of state involvement.”93 In sum, as far
as the IRS was concerned, a private school could admit or not admit
whomever it wished and still receive tax-exempt status so long as its
actions remained wholly private, without any state involvement.
The question presented to the District Court for the District of Columbia
was whether “the statutory provisions granting tax exemption may
constitutionally be extended to segregated private schools even though
operation of such schools is not otherwise unconstitutional because of state
involvement.”94 Relying heavily on the reasoning in Coffey, (and on most
of the same evidence presented to the Mississippi District Court), the
District Court for the District of Columbia granted a temporary injunction
against approving § 501(c)(3) applications, pending the resolution of the

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1129 (D.D.C. 1970).
Id. at 1129-30.
Id. at 1130.
Id.
Id. at 1131.
Id.
Id.
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litigation. The court theorized that Mississippi purposely established
segregated private schools to avoid the resulting forced desegregation and
“in an attempt to maintain a broad pattern of racial segregation in the
school system.”95
The court went on to hold that the tax benefit granted by the IRS to such
segregated schools “mean a substantial and significant support by the
Government.”96 The significant support “is not the exemption of the
schools from taxes laid on their income, but rather the deductions from
income tax available to the individuals and corporations, making
contributions supporting the school,” without which most of these schools
would never have been built.97 There is substantial support for the
conclusions that the validity of tax exemption and deductibility of
contributions are to be determined based on whether (1) their practical
tendency increases the incidence of private discrimination, and (2) the
discrimination frustrates the exercise of fundamental liberties.98
“The statute,” the court noted, “encourages, facilitates, and supports the
establishment of a system of private schools operated on a racially
segregated basis as an alternative available to white students seeking to
avoid desegregated public schools.”99 The District Court there ruled that
the IRS could not approve any pending or future applications from private
schools for tax-exempt status that do not prove that they are not racially
discriminating in the application process.100 Following this ruling, the IRS
issued Revenue Ruling 71-447, 1971-2 in 1971, which unequivocally
stated, “a private school that does not have a racially non-discriminatory
policy as to students does not qualify for exemption.”101
Many people argued that the IRS had incorrectly interpreted § 501(c)(3)
and § 170 and, further, that they had no authority to issue Revenue Rule
71-447. One such argument was made by Bob Jones University after the

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 1134.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1136.
Id. (citing Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm’n, 296 F. Supp. 1389, 1392 (S.D.
Miss 1969)).
100. Id. at 1140.
101. See Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230 (The rule defines a “racially
nondiscriminatory policy as to students” to mean that “the school admits the students of
any race to all the rights, privileges, programs, and activities generally accorded or
made available to students at that school and that the school does not discriminate on
the basis of race in administration of its educational policies, admissions policies,
scholarship and loan programs, and athletic and other school-administered programs”).
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IRS threatened to revoke its § 501(c)(3) status.102 Bob Jones University
(“Bob Jones”) refused to admit African-Americans prior to 1971.103 The
reason, said the sponsors of the University, was that the Bible prohibited
interracial dating, so admitting African-American students to their all-white
university would create too much temptation.104
Following the
promulgation of Rule 71-447, Bob Jones began admitting AfricanAmericans who were married to people within their own race.105 In 1975,
the Supreme Court issued their opinion in McCrary v. Runyon, which
found race-based admission practices at private schools violated Title 42
USC § 1981.106 Following that opinion, Bob Jones began admitting
unmarried African-Americans, but at the same time issued express, written
rules of conduct that prohibited interracial dating, belonging to a group that
advocated for interracial dating, or even encouraging someone else to
belong to a group that advocated for interracial dating.107 In April 1975,
the IRS informed Bob Jones that it had revoked the university’s tax-exempt
status for failure to comply with Rev. Rule 71-447.108 Bob Jones then paid
taxes on a single employee and sued in federal court for a refund.109
The Supreme Court heard Bob Jones along with the appeal to Green v.
Connolly under the caption Bob Jones University v. United States.110 The
Court there ruled that the IRS did have the authority to issue rule 71-447
and that their interpretation of 501(c)(3) was correct.111 In relevant part:
When the Government grants exemptions or allows deductions all
taxpayers are affected; the very fact of the exemption or deduction for
the donor means that other taxpayers can be said to be indirect and
vicarious “donors.” Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that
the exempt entity confers a public benefit—a benefit which the society
or the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which
supplements and advances the work of public institutions already
supported by tax revenues. History buttresses logic to make clear that, to
warrant exemption under § 501(c)(3), an institution must fall within a
category specified in that section and must demonstrably serve and be in
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 581 (1983).
Id. at 580.
Id.
Id.
McCrary v. Runyon, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976).
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 580-81.
Id. at 581.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 594.
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harmony with the public interest. The institution’s purpose must not be
so at odds with the common community conscience as to undermine any
112
public benefit that might otherwise be conferred.

Despite this pronouncement in 1983, there are institutions today whose
purpose is “so at odds with the community conscious as to undermine any
public benefit that might otherwise be conferred” receiving public funds to
facilitate programs that openly and blatantly discriminate. In the next
section, we will look at some specific examples of private, religious
organizations that accept tax credit money from these SSOs that
discriminate based on sexual orientation.113
D. FUNDING THE PROBLEM: A CASE STUDY IN GEORGIA
According to a January 2013 report written by the Southern Education
Foundation entitled, “Georgia’s Tax Dollars Help Finance Private Schools
with Severe Anti-Gay Policies, Practices, & Teachings,” more than onehundred, mainly Christian, private schools in Georgia accepted a combined
$170 million between 2008 and 2012 through a state tax diversion program
while maintaining policies that discriminate against LGBTQ students.114
Most of these same schools explicitly expel openly homosexual students, as
well as anyone who shows support for LGBTQ causes. These schools
enjoy tax credit funding through H.B. 1133, legislation passed in 2008
designed to direct millions of dollars from public funds, via dollar-fordollar tax credits donated by citizens, to privately funded SSOs.115
Georgia state Representative Earl Ehrhart, who initially sponsored H.B.
1133, also sponsored Georgia’s anti-gay marriage amendment that
successfully became law in 2004.116 In 2006 before he sponsored H.B.
1133, Rep. Ehrhart drafted legislation that would punish businesses
choosing not to donate money to groups that discriminate against members
of the LGBTQ community.117 This legislation came in response to Bank of
America’s Charitable Foundation decision to withhold an annual donation
to a Boy Scouts chapter in a twelve county area of South Georgia (in which

112. Id. at 591-92.
113. Id. at 592.
114. S. EDUC. FOUND., GEORGIA’S TAX DOLLARS HELP FINANCE PRIVATE SCHOOLS

SEVERE ANTI-GAY POLICIES, PRACTICES, & TEACHINGS 1 (2013), available at
http://www.southerneducation.org/getattachment/857328be-3d6b-415f-af8bda7bd3b75519/Georgia.
115. Id. at 12.
116. Id. at 11.
117. Id. at 12.
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Ehrhart served as a troop master).118 Two years later, Ehrhart, along with
co sponsor Representative George Casas, led the passage of H.B. 1133 that
established the 2008 Georgia tax credit sponsorship law. The law currently
funds schools with anti-LGBTQ policies.119 These measures are being
implemented in the wake of a nearly thirty-year effort to reverse
discrimination against LGBTQ students in schools and create a more
inclusive and welcoming environment for its members.
Despite these changes, significant resistance to the LGBTQ movement,
specifically in private schools in Georgia remain.120 Examine the following
examples of LGBTQ discrimination in written school policies that
specifically discriminate against LGBTQ students from schools currently
accepting SSO funds:
In Augusta, Georgia, Augusta Christian School’s policy listed in their
handbook states, “[e]ach student of the school shall be of the highest moral
character and be obedient to all Biblical principles, including, but not
limited to, prohibitions against fornication, drug use, alcohol use,
pornography, and homosexuality.”121 Cherokee Christian Schools in
Woodstock, Georgia’s handbook specifically states, “[i]n accordance with
the Statement of Faith and in recognition of Biblical principles, no
‘immoral act’ or ‘identifying statements’ concerning fornication, adultery,
homosexuality, lesbianism, bisexuality, or pornography, will be tolerated.
Such behavior will constitute grounds for expulsion.”122 Providence
Christian Academy in Lilburn, Georgia not only expels gay students, but
any student who supports or condones gay rights. Their student handbook
specifically states that, “[a]cts of homosexuality . . . may put the student’s
enrollment at Providence Christian Academy in jeopardy.” As a result of
such behavior, “the student and parents may be asked to meet with the
Administration and/or Discipline Committee.”123
Finally, Dominion
118. Id. at 11-12. In 2000, after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Boy Scouts
can prohibit gay men from holding leadership positions, Ehrhart pre-filed a bill to
guarantee that the Boy Scouts could not be denied access to public facilities, despite the
fact that there were no signs anyone was trying to do so.
119. Id. at 12 n.14.
120. Id. at 17.
121. AUGUSTA CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, STUDENT-PARENT HANDBOOK 2013-2014 7
(2013), available at http://www.augustachristian.org/Resources/5257.pdf.
122. CHEROKEE CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, STUDENT/PARENT HANDBOOK 2013/2014 17
(2013),
available
at
http://www.cherokeechristian.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/CCHSHandbook2013-2014ver1-2.pdf.
123. PROVIDENCE CHRISTIAN ACADEMY, 2013/2014 PARENT/STUDENT HANDBOOK
46 (2013), available at
http://www.providencechristianacademy.org/Customized/uploads/Dee%20Folder/HAN
DBOOK%20FINAL%2013-14%20FOR%20WEB.pdf.
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Christian School in Marietta, Georgia, on whose board of trustees Rep. Earl
Ehrhart currently sits,124 states in its handbook that the school “retain[s] the
right to refuse enrollment to or to expel any student who engages in sexual
immorality, including any student who professes to be homosexual/
bisexual or is a practicing homosexual/bisexual, as well as any student who
condones, supports, or otherwise promotes such practices (Leviticus 20:13;
Romans 1:27).”125
Much like the segregated schools of the Jim Crow era, these school
policies openly and blatantly refuse admission to students who either are
LGBTQ or support LGBTQ rights. According to the Rolling Stone article
“The Hidden War Against Gay Teens,”
“. . . only 10 percent of white students in Georgia’s public-education
system attend a virtually segregated school (in which white students
constitute at least 90 percent of the overall school population); yet for
white students attending a private school affiliated with an SSO, that
number rose to 53 percent. Kick LGBTQ kids out of the equation, and
the school population only becomes more and more homogenous – at the
expense of millions of dollars that could be going into the public school
126
system.”

These statistics, along with the precedent behind the push to expunge
LGBTQ students from Christian schools funded by SSOs, connect to the
segregationist motives stemming from the 1950s that were so prominent in
the south. However, unlike the cases cited above, in which the Supreme
Court needed experts and statistical evidence gathered over time to prove
that de facto segregation was taking place in those private schools, these
Georgia schools are openly discriminate in their written policies against
LGBTQ students, teachers and supporters. In fact, H.B. 1133 strongly
resembles a plan to avoid racial integration that Governor Herman
Talmadge tried to implement in 1953.127
124. Board
of
Trustees,
DOMINION
CHRISTIAN
SCHOOLS,
http://www.dominionchristian.org/students-parents/faculty-admin-staff/board-oftrustees (last visited Jan. 25, 2015).
125. DOMINION CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, PARENT & STUDENT HANDBOOK 2014-2015 14
(2014),
available
at
http://www.dominionchristian.org/jdownloads/Current%20Students%20%20Families/2
014-2015-student-handbook.pdf.
126. Morris, supra note 16.
127. See KEVIN M. KRUSE, WHITE FLIGHT: ATLANTA & THE MAKING OF MODERN
CONSERVATISM 132 (2d ed., 2007). See generally Bruce Wilson, How Segregation
Helped Create the Religious Right and the School Privatization Movement, TALK TO
ACTION
(Oct.
18,
2013,
1:39
PM),
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As discussed in the preceding section, states throughout the south began
to open segregated private schools in response to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.128 Specifically, the “Talmadge
Plan,” authored by Georgia governor Herman Talmadge in 1953, was
designed to privatize the public school system in Georgia in the event that
the Supreme Court struck down segregation.129 In White Flight: Atlanta
and the Making of Modern Conservatism, Kevin M. Kruse details
Talmadge’s endeavor by stating that the Talmadge Plan gave the state
government the power to privatize the entire public education system.130 In
the event of forced desegregation, the state would close the public schools
and issue students grants to attend private, segregated schools.131 “We can
maintain separate schools regardless of the U.S. Supreme Court,”
Talmadge promised, “by reverting to a private system, subsidizing the child
rather than the political subdivision.”132
Fortunately, this plan never came to fruition, but H.B. 1133 and the goals
of these SSOs echo the same scheme. To clarify the connection, the
Talmadge Plan would have given students monetary grants to attend
private, segregated schools free from the legal reach of the U.S. Supreme
Court, which would support the child and not the “political subdivision.”133
H.B. 1133 is similar in the sense that it directs dollars into privately funded
SSOs. Similar to the Talmadge Plan, this money is not considered “public
funds” because it goes straight toward benefitting students and not the
schools.134 In the words of Steve Suitts, president of the Southern
Education Fund, and a strong critic of schools that discriminate against
LGBTQ students, “[H.B. 1133] was designed in order to simply start
building a publicly funded, publicly supported private-school system in the
state.”135

http://www.talk2action.org/story/2013/10/18/13397/601/Front_Page/Dear_Michelle_R
hee_Your_School_Privatization_Schemes_Were_Hatched_By_Southern_Segregationis
ts.
128. See Wilson, supra note 129.
129. See id.
130. See id. (citing KEVIN M. KRUSE, WHITE FLIGHT: ATLANTA & THE MAKING OF
MODERN CONSERVATISM 132 (2d ed., 2007).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See Wilson, supra note 129 (citing Alex Morris, The Hidden War Against Gay
Teens, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/thehidden-war-against-gay-teens-20131010)).
135. Morris, supra note 16.
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E. THE IMPACT OF DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES ON THE LGBTQ YOUTH
COMMUNITY
The specific psychological implications that schools with anti-LGBTQ
have in their policies are immense. LGBTQ students already face daily
difficulties without pressure from schools. Research from the Gay,
Lesbian, and Straight Education Network shows that in cases concerning
sexual orientation, 86.2% of LGBTQ youths reported being verbally
harassed, while 44.1% reported being physically harassed.136 Concerning
gender expression, 66.5% of LGBTQ youths reported verbal harassment,
and 30.4% reported physical harassment.137 Ninety percent of all public
school students reported hearing anti-gay remarks on a daily basis.138 Drug
use is also an issue among LGBTQ youths.139 LGBTQ adolescents are
more likely to use illegal substances such as drugs and alcohol than
heterosexual adolescents are.140 Additionally, a 2011 study published in
Pediatrics shows that LGBTQ teenagers living and operating in a negative
social environment have a twenty percent greater suicide risk than LGBTQ
students living in a more supportive and positive social environment.141
The stress of being a teenager is already intense because of consistent
pressure from parents, teachers, coaches, and peers to perform to certain
expectations, all while lacking the cognitive abilities that makes processing
stress easier.142 Most teenagers already possess the feeling that people are
always watching their every move and, as a result, are performing for an
“imaginary audience” to meet illogical and unnecessary expectations.143
The added stress that stems from bullying, exclusion, and isolation
136. See Kristopher M. Goodrich & Melissa Luke, LGBTQ Responsive School
Counseling, 3 J. OF LGBT ISSUES IN COUNSELING 113, 115 (2009).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See generally Heather L. Corliss et al., Sexual Orientation and Drug Use in a
Longitudinal Cohort Study of U.S. Adolescents, 35 ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 517 (2010),
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2830345.
140. Id.
141. Mark L. Hatzenbuehler, The Social Environment and Suicide Attempts in
Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youth, 127 PEDIATRICS 896, 896 (2011), available at
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/early/2011/04/18/peds.2010-3020.full.pdf.
142. See generally Leanne Italie, Teens Turn to Life Coaches to Cope with
Pressures,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Nov.
7,
2011,
2:58
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/07/teens-turn-to-life-coache_n_1080286.html
(detailing the efforts of life coaches to help navigate the various pressures that
teenagers often face).
143. See Pat T. Nelson, Teen Cognitive Development, UNIV. OF DEL. COOP.
EXTENSION (Aug. 7, 2012), http://extension.udel.edu/factsheet/teen-cognitivedevelopment.
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affecting LGBTQ youths makes teen life even more difficult. This stress is
often referred to as minority stress, which explains, “that stigma, prejudice,
and discrimination create a hostile and stressful social environment that
causes mental health problems.”144 Minority stress contributes to general
stress that all people experience; therefore, people, particularly LGBTQ
youths, feel compelled to put forth additional effort that is often not
necessary for others not stigmatized.145 This added stressor for LGBTQ
youths contributes to a number of mental health issues, specifically the risk
of suicide.146 Additionally, LGBTQ people who exhibit suicidal behavior
not only have more stressors, but a majority of youth attempting suicide
exhibit signs of mental disorder at the time of the attempted suicide.147
Given these statistics, it is important to make an effort of recognizing
LGBTQ students without objectifying them; the threat of losing taxexemption status may pressure private schools to create friendlier
environments for LGBTQ youth and significantly reduce these negative
stressors.
F. CONCLUSION
On the night of February 8, 2014, before a crowd at the New York City
Human Rights Campaign’s gala, Attorney General Eric Holder addressed
the issue of federal recognition of LGBTQ married couples, stating, “[j]ust
like during the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the stakes involved in
this generation’s struggle for LGBTQ equality could not be higher. As
Attorney General, I will not let this Department be simply a bystander
during this important moment in history.”148 Attorney General Holder
went on to announce that the federal government would no longer
distinguish between homosexual and heterosexual marriages for federal
purposes, regardless of residency or state recognition.149 This move means
that the federal government now affords same-sex couples all the same
rights and benefits of any other couple in federal legal matters including
144. See Ilan H. Meyer, Prejudice, Social Stress, and Mental Health in Lesbian,
Gay, and Bisexual Populations: Conceptual Issues and Research Evidence, 129
PSYCHOL.
BULL.
674,
1
(2003),
available
at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2072932.
145. Id. at 675.
146. Id. at 679.
147. See Annette L. Beautrais, Life Course Factors Associated with Suicidal
Behaviors in Young People, 46 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1137, 1145 (2003).
148. Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Human Rights Campaign Greater New
York Gala (Feb. 10, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorneygeneral-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-human-rights-campaign-greater-new-york-gala.
149. Id.
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tax, bankruptcy, estate, and insurance.150 Then, on July 21, 2014, President
Obama signed an executive order banning workplace discrimination
against members of the LGBTQ community who are employees of federal
contractors and the federal government.151 What makes this order
particularly important is that it did not include a religious exemption.152
This move is already creating controversy, especially in the wake of the
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby ruling that allows religious-based businesses to
opt out of certain aspects of the Affordable Care Act due to religious
beliefs. This movement toward equality at the federal level memorializes
the shift in public sentiment that has been occurring over the last twenty
years.
The movement toward recognizing and embracing LGBTQ youths and
their struggles gained traction in 1994 when community leaders officially
enacted LGBT History Month.153 In 2000, President Bill Clinton declared
June “Gay and Lesbian Pride Month,”154 and in 2009 President Barack
Obama proclaimed June as “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered
Pride Month.”155 In addition to these enactments, middle and high schools
have begun to implement lesson plans, intervention plans, professional
counseling, and consulting services for LGBTQ youths.156 The American
School Counseling Association website provides links and information
dedicated to implementing said plans.157 These political and educational
movements mark a significant shift in attitudes toward LGBTQ people,

150. Id.
151. See generally Jennifer Bendery, Obama Signs Executive Order on LGBT Job

Discrimination,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(July
21,
2014,
10:50
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/21/obama-gay-rights_n_5605482.html.
152. See generally Zachary A. Goldfarb, White House Says Obama’s LGBT
Executive Order Will Not Provide Religious Exemption, WASH. POST (July 18, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-says-obamas-lgbt-executiveorder-will-not-provide-religious-exemption/2014/07/18/8ec441a4-0eb9-11e4-b8e5d0de80767fc2_story.html.
153. About
LGBT
History
Month,
EQUALITY
FORUM,
http://lgbthistorymonth.com/background (last visited Jan. 25, 2015).
154. Proclamation No. 7316, 3 C.F.R. 92, 92 (2000).
155. See Kathy Kiely, President Hails Gay Pride Month, USA TODAY (June 1,
2009,
5:28
PM),
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2009/06/67521623/1#.U5HpihkJUQ.
156. See generally Kandace Van Wanderham, Supporting LGBTQ Faculty: The
School Counselor’s Role, AM. SCH. COUNS. ASS’N (May 1, 2011),
http://schoolcounselor.org/magazine/blogs/may-june-2011/supporting-lgbtq-facultythe-school-counselor-s-r.
157. See id.
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specifically for youths who were born after 1994, and have had significant
exposure to this movement. In fact, according to an article published in
USA Today in June of 2009, young adults among eighteen to twenty-nine
years-old are tolerant of homosexuality; seventy-three percent support
same-sex marriage.158 A March 2013 Washington Post-ABC News poll
shows eighty-one percent of young Americans aged eighteen to twentynine supporting same-sex marriage, an eight percent increase over four
years.159 This shift not only works to maintain congruency with Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Romer v. Evans, especially when he stated, “. . . a
general announcement that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular
protections . . . inflicts on them immediate, continuing and real injuries,”
but also contributes on a larger level to an increasing celebration and
recognition of the rights of LGBTQ individuals. Despite these advances,
the challenges presented to LGBTQ teens, even in the most inclusive
environments, are still very real.
Just as they did for racial equality in 1964, the federal government has
made enormous strides for LGBTQ equality. However, the fact remains
that individual states and private institutions are still openly discriminating
against homosexuals every day, particularly in private, religious schools, as
discussed above. Given the nearly iron-clad protection afforded to private,
religious schools by the First Amendment, the only practical method for
remedying this wrong is the same one used to force desegregation—
requiring private schools to adopt neutral admission standards for all
students, regardless of sexual orientation, in order to obtain and maintain
their § 501(c)(3) status. This measure would not only help to quell efforts
to discriminate against LGBTQ youths, but would also contribute to
maintaining an overall healthier lifestyle for the LGBTQ population.
In conclusion, it is important to note that this paper does not argue that
schools of any sort should allow or advocate for openly sexual behavior
between students of any orientation on campus. It is for that very reason,
however, that private, religious schools must recognize that identifying as
LGBTQ is not, in and of itself, an overtly sexual act. Gender and sexual
identity-neutral rules requiring students at private, religious schools to take
oaths of celibacy or to adhere to strict behavioral guidelines concerning
public displays of affection is entirely within the rights of those
158. See Susan Page, Poll: Attitudes Toward Gays Changing Fast, USA TODAY
(Dec.
5,
2012,
5:02
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2012/12/05/poll-from-gay-marriage-toadoption-attitudes-changing-fast/1748873.
159. Jon Cohen, Gay Marriage Support Hits New High in Post-ABC Poll, WASH.
POST
(Mar.
18,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/thefix/wp/2013/03/18/gay-marriage-support-hits-new-high-in-post-abc-poll.
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schools. But when those same rules extend beyond sexual actions to issues
of identity, advocacy, and tolerance, they enter the realm of discrimination
which has negative effects not just on the students, but on society at large.
Just like African-American students in the Jim Crow South, these schools
are attempting to discriminate against their students because of how they
were born and how they identify to the world, whether or not these students
share the same religious, moral, and ethical values of their fellows. If the
federal government acknowledges that LGBTQ citizens should be afforded
equal rights at the federal level then measures must be taken to ensure that
any entity benefiting from federal funding should be required to support
that goal, or at least, not to undermine it.
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